Russian interference in the U.S. electoral process: Evolution and analysis of disinformation campaigns

Dr. Carlos Galan, Nebrija University and Carlos III University of Madrid**, Dr. Javier Valencia,** Nebrija University


Detect
When
Combat
Who
How

Evolution and analysis of disinformation campaigns

Figure 2: The Cross-Platform IRA Activity, for All Platforms, Monthly Totals (Twitter on Right Axis)



Note: Facebook, Instagram and YouTube relative to the primary left axis, Twitter relative to the secondary right axis.

Source: Authors' calculations based on data provided by the SSCI

Russian disinformation

Selected events



Evolution and analysis of disinformation campaigns

When

May 2018

USA REALLY

2020

NARRATIVE ASSOCIATED WITH COVID

2022

UKRAINE

2024

Doppelgänger

Matrioska

SDA

Evolution and analysis of disinformation campaigns

Who



Source: C. Watts, Alliance for Securing Democracy

Evolution and analysis of disinformation campaigns

Who



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Evolution and analysis of disinformation campaigns

How



STATE ACTORS

SOCIAL NETWORK PLATFORMS



CYBERATTACKS

MASS MEDIA
JOURNALISTS
INFLUENCERS

STATE CONTROLLED ACTORS

TROLLS FARMS



BOTNETS



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Detecting and combating these campaigns





	EXECUTE						ASSESS
TA07: Select Channels and Affordances	TA08: Conduct Pump Priming	TA09: Deliver Content	TA17: Maximize Exposure	TA18: Drive Online Harms	TA10: Drive Offline Activity	TA11: Persist in the Information Environment	TA12: Assess Effectiveness
T0029: Online polls	T0020: Trial content	T0114: Deliver Ads	T0049: Flooding the Information Space	T0047: Censor social media as a political force	T0017: Conduct fundraising	T0059: Play the long game	T0132: Measure Performance
T0043: Chat apps	T0039: Bait legitimate influencers	T0114.001: Social media	T0049.001: Trolls amplify and manipulate	T0048: Harass	T0017.001: Conduct Crowdfunding Campaigns	T0060: Continue to Amplify	T0132.001: People Focused
T0043.001: Use Encrypted Chat Apps	T0042: Seed Kernel of truth	T0114.002: Traditional Media	T0049.002: Hijack existing hashtag	T0048.001: Boycott/"Cancel" Opponents	T0057: Organize Events	T0128: Conceal People	T0132.002: Content Focused
T0043.002: Use Unencrypted Chats Apps	T0044: Seed distortions	T0115: Post Content	T0049.003: Bots Amplify via Automated Forwarding and Reposting	T0048.002: Harass People Based on Identities	T0057.001: Pay for Physical Action	T0128.001: Use Pseudonyms	T0132.003: View Focused

¿IS THIS A MINISTRY OF TRUTH?

R =

0-25 0

25-50 1

50-75 2

75-100 3

Quantitative approach

N = R ± 1

Qualitative approach

N' = N ± 1



Risk Level	What we mean	What you should do
Green		
Yellow		
Orange		
Red		

PRE-INCIDENT

MID-INCIDENT

POST-INCIDENT

ANSWER

Detecting and combating these campaigns



Thank youiii
Questions???

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